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Ever since the advent of an industrialized society, one of 
the most interesting yet intriguing questions facing economists 
is formulating a plausible explanation for the ups and downs qf 
the economy. Throughout time, a wide variety of theories have 
been proposed, ranging from the critical role of private 
investment of J.B. Clark to the underconsumption approach of 
Thomas Halthus. However, none have been able to withstand the 
test of innovation as countless economists are striving each year 
to find a breakthrough in business cycle theory. The business 
cycle is a major issue both inside and outside of the political 
arena and is worthy of the research it demands today. As Charles 
Plosser notes, "When we think of business cycles, we frequently 
think about notions of persistence or serial correlation in 
economic aggregates; comovement among economic activities; 
leading or lagging variables relative to output; and different 
amplitudes or volatilities of various series" (53). One strand 
of thought growing out of the 1980's fits this definition quite 
well in a theoretical sense. The Real Business Cycle theory 
(RBC) has generated a fervor among business cycle analysts and 
offers a great deal of hope in unraveling the mystery of defining 
what causes a cycle. Is it a viable explanation for the cycle or 
merely a "catch-phrase" theory for 1980's? This is the question 
that is looking for an answer.
Up until the 1930's, the classical economists' reliance on 
supply-side effects as the major cause of changes in aggregate 
economic activity dominated macroeconomic thinking. However, it
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was Keynes’ General Theory in 1936 which swung the pendulum over 
to the demand side and provided the impetus for a demand versus 
supply side explanation of the business cycle which still exists 
today. Thomas E. Hall details, "His revolution was successful 
because for the past fifty plus years the major business cycle 
theories have been based on the instability of aggregate demand” 
(121). The major modern demand-side theories (monetarist, 
rational expectations and new Keynesian) have the two important 
tenets of a reversion of real GNP to its trend value and the 
belief that real wages are countercyclical following changes in 
aggregate demand because of incorrect price expectations (Hall 
21). These two points will be re-iterated later, but suffice it 
to say that the modern demand-side theories’ inability to explain 
the tendency of the real wage to be procyclical or acyclical 
following a change in aggregate demand has generated the 
skepticism which led to the Real Business Cycle approach.
With the shortcomings of an aggregate demand approach and 
the appearance of supply shocks in the 1970’s, economists turned 
the clock back to the classical days of stressing aggregate 
supply within the business cycle framework with an added twist.
It is the Real Business Cycle theory which holds that it is real, 
rather than monetary factors which cause fluctuations in economic 
activity. Exogenous shocks to aggregate supply are the cause of 
all cycles and since shocks occur in all economies, cycles are 
indeed ’’natural’’ (Sherman 60). The RBC theory offers a twist to 
the classical^ theory in that it has the added feature of
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predicting procyclical real wages. Like most other neoclassical 
theories, the RBC approach is ahistorical in that it suggests 
that all economies have cycles on the basis of theory rather than 
an extensive empirical survey (Sherman 60). While a Keynesian 
approach to the cycle enjoys this empirical success, its lack of 
what many consider a less than sound theoretical foundation has 
led to some skepticism. This point is highly debateable, thus 
meriting a further explanation.
The Keynesian interpretation of macroeconomic phenomenons, 
such as the business cycle, show an absence of foundation based 
on the choice theoretic framework of microeconomics (Plosser 51). 
Two papers, one by Milton Friedman in 1968 and the other by 
Robert Lucas in 1976 illustrate this point quite well.
Friedman’s approach engulfed the tradeoff between inflation and 
some measure of real output or unemployment, or the Phillip's 
Curve in textbook jargon. Such a tradeoff was a major feature of 
the Keynesian system of the 1960’s. Friedman's argument showed 
that basic microeconomic principles placed a premise on the long 
run Phillip's curve being vertical. Thus, sustained inflation 
was compatible with any level of real demand of goods. A major 
tenet of Keynesian thinking was shown to be in contrast with 
microeconomic principles.
Lucas' contribution to the theoretical foundation question 
stressed that expectations about future policy will 
systematically influence current decisions and thus alter the 
behavioral relations exploited by implementation of the empirical
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analysis (Plosser 52). Concurrently, expectations cannot be 
formulated or specified in arbitrary manner and be consistent 
with individual maximazation.
While both works point out theoretical shortcomings in the 
Keynesian framework, a more poignant fact arises out of a static 
versus dynamic economic state confrontation. The foundations of 
the Keynesian model are static and focus on determining output at 
a point in time, treating the capital stock as given. Dynamic 
elements through accelerator mechanisms and price or wage 
adjustment equations have been introduced into the model, but 
these elements did not arise from any theoretical framework of 
maximization but rather from simple behavior rules which either 
characterized agents or markets in general (Plosser 52). Dynamic 
adjustment was merely an empirical question as to which 
economist’s formulation fit the data best. Keynesian models also 
start out asserting market failures and do not measure up to 
Hick’s "idealized state." Hicks notes, "It is logically 
impossible to attribute an important portion of fluctuations to 
market failure without an understanding of the sorts of 
fluctuations that would be observed in the absence of the 
hypothesized market failure" (52). Theoretically, this static 
and dynamic economic system debate lessens, to a degree, the 
Keynesian theory of the business cycle.
I do not profess to claim that this is a complete discussion 
of the theoretical shortcomings of the Keynesian model. 
Nevertheless, a Keynesian discussion does have some "theoretical
holes" which has led to alternative explanations of the cycle.
As a new theory, the Real Busines Cycle model has garnered an 
enormous amount of attention in a short period of time.
The theoretical foundation behind the Real Business Cycle 
theory is relatively straight-forward and best demonstrated by a 
simple model. It is difficult to offer one "true" model which 
encompasses the entire RBC approach because it is being revised 
to include such factors as to what role does money and aggregate 
demand play in the model? These points will be taken up later, 
but I feel it to be in the best interest of the reader to leave 
out the aforementioned questions and get to the heart of the RBC 
issue by concentrating on how exogenous shocks to aggregate 
supply can move through a simple model eloquently illustrated by 
Thomas E. Hall. The model is based on the premise of perfect 
competition with no externalities and assumes three things.
First, after new goods are ordered, they take several periods to 
build. Second, following changes in income, households gradually 
adjust their consumption patterns over time. Third, the model 
assumes that wages and prices are perfectly flexible which 
ensures that all trading takes place in equilibrium (Hall 124).
Exogenous shocks can be the result of demographic changes, 
technology shocks, changes in relative input prices or changes in 
consumer preferences. Supply-side effects can best be 
illustrated by a Cobb-Douglas production function where real GNP 
(Y) is a function of labor input, (L) capital stock (K) and a 
term which picks up shocks to the production function (z).
5
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Y = f(L ,K ,Z )
The shock term (Z) can further be illustrated and assumed to 
evolve around a constant term ( ) and a random error term with
an expected value of zero (e).
z = +e
Shocks may occur in the economy which affect the production 
function (f) itself such as a major advancement in technology 
which allows a given stock of capital and labor to produce more 
output for a set price level. Similarly, shocks may affect the 
inputs of labor (L) and capital (K) availability. The "baby 
boom" and changes in the relative price of energy are two prime 
examples, respectively.
A major premise of the RBC theory is that the economy is 
constantly receiving exogenous shocks to the production function, 
whether they be major like a war, or more commonly smaller shocks 
to labor, capital and technology which have a positive trend 
value ( ) and a random component (e). The positive trend value
denotes that, over time, positive influences on aggregate supply 
lead to growth. The random component ensures that the shocks, on 
average, have a neutral rather than a good or bad effect on 
economic activity.
One may erroneously conclude from the model and its neutral 
error term (e) with an expected value of zero that the various 
shocks cancel each other out in succeeding periods. Upon closer 
investigation, shocks can occur consecutively in successive 
periods. For example, if several positive shocks occur, output
7
grows more rapidly.
From a testing standpoint, the fact that technology shocks 
are unobservable is a drawback. In order to conduct empirical 
research as to the effect technological change has, researchers 
use Solow residuals. Going back to our production function and 
assuming that factors are paid their marginal products, data on 
the total shares of output going to an input can be used to infer 
the coefficients of the production function. Using these 
coefficients, it is possible to deduce what would be the change 
in GNP from one year to the next if only the inputs changed.
Then, any difference between the actual change in GNP and the 
calculated change must be attributed to changes in technology 
(Rush 19).
With a basic introduction to an RBC model, how does the 
model explain persistent output changes? Persistence in the 
sense that output will tend to grow more than trend during 
expansions for several quarters and less than trend during a 
recession. If, as the model implies, economic fluctuations are 
caused by a series of shocks in the same direction or a single 
major shock, both should be able to explain persistent output 
changes. According to Hall, "In the case of a series of shocks 
in the same direction, we can easily see how this causes 
expansionary or contractionary pressure on output for several 
periods" (124). It is with the single exogenous shock where we 
can view Hall's model in action.
Hall assumes an economy in a steady state with a long run
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economic growth rate of three percent and no random shocks so 
that our e value is zero. Introducing a single positive shock 
such as robot technology which makes production easier, firms 
which can benefit from such technology will immediately demand 
it. The producers of such demanded technology will see an 
increase in labor needed and because wage rigidities aren't 
assumed to exist, both employment and real wages rise (Hall 124). 
The time-to-build and smoothed consumption spending implications 
of the model lead to the important conclusion that since it will 
take several periods to fill new orders, households will continue 
to earn higher wages and will spread their increased consumption 
pattern from the higher wages over several periods. With 
increased spending by households over time, aggregate output and 
employment will grow more than trend for a number of periods.
One can easily see that real wages behave in a procyclical manner 
as the technology shock increases the marginal products of both 
labor and capital and the subsequent increase in labor demanded 
raised both employment and the real wage. Such a conclusion is a 
major tenet of the RBC cause.
Eventually, the effect of the shock works its way through 
the economy. The new technology becomes embedded into the 
production pattern and the economy returns to a steady state 
equilibrium with a three percent growth rate. What must be made 
evidently clear is that the RBC approach assumes that the three 
percent growth rate takes place at a higher base level of output 
than before. Such an assumption puts the theory in direct
conflict with demand-side theories, a point that will be 
expounded upon later. As one can see, a single exogenous shock 
in the form of a technological advance has led to an increase in 
real GNP and offers a theoretical proof of the Real Business 
Cycle theory. In no way is this model deemed to be an all- 
encompassing entity of the RBC approach. Other models, most 
significantly those of Plosser (1982) and Kyland and Prescott 
(1982) are similar in nature and offer only a few expansions on 
the model presented here. While an RBC model may not enjoy the 
empirical success that a demand-side model can at the present, 
its theoretical foundation is valid and commands further 
research.
With a general understanding of what the RBC theory 
encompasses, it is its conflict with modern demand-side theories 
of the cycle where we now turn our attention. Such conflict 
keeps business cycle theorists divided as to which theory gives a 
truer approximation of the cycle. The conflict can best be 
described most accurately on the two fronts where the RBC 
approach differs radically from a demand-side approach. First is 
the argument over real GNP changes, are they real or transitory? 
Demand-side models propose that fluctuations in real GNP are only 
temporary deviations from the natural rate and, eventually, real 
GNP will return to this natural rate. The RBC model counters 
with the belief that output changes are permanent and there is no 
reason to believe that real GNP will return to a trend line.
Here we see real GNP following a random walk pattern. While the
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RBC theory relies very little on empirical proof, the resolution 
of the trend-reversion, random walk debate can only be settled 
empirically. Specifically, time series analysis is used and 
offers a way of tracking a variable’s (real GNP) history through 
specific equations (Hall 127). The equation specific to the 
demand-side trend reversion model is
InY = InY + gT
where In indicates natural logarithm, Y is real GNP, g is the 
trend rate of growth of real GNP, T is time and subscripted t 
represents the time period (Hall 127). Natural logs offer the 
handy property that if a variable has a constant growth rate, 
then any change in that variable's natural log will also be 
constant. By starting with the natural log of real GNP at any 
pre-determined time o and extrapolating the average growth rate 
of real GNP (3.2% per year since 1950), we are able to determine 
the log of natural real GNP (InY ) in any time period and see how 
real GNP grows. As previously mentioned, this trend-reversion 
model postulates that GNP is allowed to stray from the natural 
rate in the short run but must revert to the natural rate in the 
long run. An equation which describes this process is
InY = InY + B (InY -InY ) +u
where Y is actual real GNP, B is a coefficient on lagged output 
deviations that lies between zero and one, and u is a term with 
an expected value of zero (Hall 128). The value of the InY is 
merely calculated from the previous equation. It is the B term, 
however, which is integral to this whole process. The trend-
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reversion model claims this value lies between zero and one which 
ensures that whenever real GNP is not on the trend line, the 
tendency is for output to return to the trend line. One could 
plug a variety of numbers into the two equations and come up with 
a number of values of the natural log of real GNP and graph these 
values to see growth or contractions. It is within the B term 
where we will see real GNP return to its trend value. Suppose 
that B is 0.6. If a random shock raises real GNP 60 billion 
above trend, the next period that 60 billion will correspond to 
the time period t-1 and real GNP in period t will lie .6 * 60 or 
36 billion above trend. The subsequent period will see real GNP 
lie .6 * 36 or 21.6 billion above trend. The point to be taken 
here is that eventually this number will reach zero and real GNP 
will return to the trend line.
The random walk hypothesis adds a slight twist to the 
aforementioned equations. Within this hypothesis, the B term is 
assumed to be one. If a positive shock hits the economy, the 
trend line will shift up by the amount of the shock and will 
continue on this path until a negative shock shifts it back down 
(Plosser 59). However, because the B term is assumed to be one, 
there is no reason to believe that real GNP will revert back to 
the trend line.
If the two models assume different values for B, which one 
is correct? Results using the equation
InY = + BlnY + u
have shown that one cannot reject the hypothesis that B equals
12
one through empirical testing. Bennett Me Callum has pointed out 
that such results could be taken in the wrong manner as the 
random walk hypothesis is true only if B is exactly equal to one. 
A B value of .99 would shift proof towards the trend-reversion 
model (Klein 45). According to Thomas E. Hall, "Being unable to 
reject the real business cycle claim that B equals one doesn't 
necessarily mean that we can reject the trend reversion model 
with B slightly less than one. As a result, the empirical 
evidence is not conclusive about whether real GNP follows a 
random walk or a trend reversion model because neither claim can 
be rejected" (131).
Turning our attention to an even more volatile issue between 
demand and supply discrepancies, it is the role of money in 
influencing output which is receiving the greatest amount of 
attention. A staunch real business cycle theory argues that, 
even in the short run, money doesn't influence output. Instead, 
output growth influences monetary growth. The modern demand-side 
theories, in contrast, place a heavy premise on monetary changes 
being the major cause of business cycles. Friedman and 
Schwartz's Monetary History of the United States in 1963 fostered 
enthusiasm in this belief as they argued that over the period 
1867-1960, every economic expansion was accompanied with a rise 
in the monetary growth rate and every contraction accompanied by 
a lowering of the monetary growth rate (Rush 21). Such proven 
knowledge brought monetarism to the forefront of macroeconomic 
thinking and offered a solid explanation of monetary growth and
the business cycle. This belief came under fire in the early 
1980’s with Sims' vector autoregression model (VAR). A VAR 
specifies each variable in the system as a function of its own 
history and lagged values of other variables in the system (Hall 
133). Sims' four equation VAR model included output, money, 
prices and interest rates. Each variable was isolated in a 
separate equation with the lagged value of this variable coupled 
with the lagged values of the other three being capable of 
explaining its current value. By empirically testing each 
equation with collected data values, one can deduce if interest 
rates, money or prices are statistically significant enough to 
influence output changes. What Sims concluded was that when 
interest rates were included in the output equation, interest 
rates influenced real GNP but money did not. (133). Other tests 
using vector autoregression models done by Litterman and Weiss in 
1985 supported Sims' results (Rush 15). As in the case of the 
trend-reversion versus random walk hypothesis, empirical testing 
has been unable to settle once and for all the monetary issue. 
Both sides present poignant arguments and have a degree of 
empirical proof, yet the debate wages on.
The preceding discussion has dealt with many aspects of the 
Real Business Cycle theory. As a theory worthy of continued 
research and discussion, I find it to be a major part of the 
economic arena. As an all-encompassing solution to business 
cycle analysis, it fails on many counts. It would seem erroneous 
to back the original, straight-forward RBC approach. The
13
complete non-recognition of aggregate demand effects and the 
neutrality of money damper what is otherwise a revolutionary way 
of looking at the business cycle. In particular, the 
incorporation of a government sector into our simple model can 
have profound aggregate demand implications. Recently, Lawrence 
Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum have extended the RBC model to 
include government purchases of goods and services along with 
unemployment within its framework. Their results show that the 
correlation between productivity shocks and output is lowered. 
(Rush 18). By introducing a simple form of aggregate demand, a 
major aspect of the RBC model (that of productivity shocks 
significantly affecting output) is lowered. Also, raising 
government purchases induces a negative wealth effect which tends 
to reduce consumption and raise work effort and output. As 
increased household consumption from a productivity shock fuels 
real GNP growth greater than trend in our simple model, the 
inclusion of government purchases will tend to negate this 
consumption effect. While the jury is still out on how much of 
real GNP growth can be attributed to demand or supply-side 
disturbances, the complete exclusion of aggregate demand in favor 
of aggregate supply is a bit hasty.
The jury is still out, coincidentally, on the issue of money 
neutrality. The RBC belief that changes in money supply are the 
consequence of "reverse causation" that is, fluctuations in money 
supply are a response to output fluctuations initiated by 
technology shocks is a polar opposite of modern demand-side
14
theories (Klein 45). As previously discussed, one can find 
evidence to support both conclusions. While being someone who is 
still a novice in the field of business cycle studies, I 
nevertheless find it hard to conform to the belief that money is 
completely neutral. Sims' vector autoregression model has come 
under fire by Me Callum in 1986 who argues that the findings are 
predictable because he uses data over a period when the Federal 
Reserve was targeting interest rates. By raising the federal 
funds rate, the public is coerced into holding less money. As 
the public reduces their quantity of money demanded, the quantity 
of money falls and real GNP lowers in the short run. The 
conclusion Me Callum finds is, because of interest rate 
targeting, we find a correlation between interest rates and 
output when the true relation is between money and output (Hall 
134) .
What I see as a probable resolution to the neutrality of the 
money issue is a compromise by both sides. I feel the RBC 
approach needs to incorporate the money factor by modifying 
standard real cycle models. Such incorporation need not accept 
the monetary influence as a major part of the cycle, but it 
should at least recognize the possible influence monetary factors 
have. While the insight provided by the RBC model that broader 
money supply measures are endogenous is worthwhile indeed, narrow 
measures of money and their effects on economic activity must be 
taken into account of. Finn Kyland in 1989 introduces money into 
the model in two ways. First, he assumes that changes in the
15
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money supply create confusion about the real wage. Given this 
confusion, people would react to unexpected changes in the money 
supply as if they were changes in real factors. Second, he 
introduces money as a means to conserve on transaction costs 
(Rush 21). In both instances, money can play a small role within 
the Real Business Cycle model.
Research into the Real Business Cycle theory is still in its 
infancy today. However, it has been poignant in the fact that it 
has pointed out that supply-side factors also can play a role in 
economic fluctuations. Charles I. Plosser points out that, "The 
appeal of this line of research is the apparent power of some 
very simple economic principles to generate dynamic behavior that 
was heretofore thought to be incompatible with any notion of 
equilibrium" (71). The reliance on analyzing only technological 
or productivity shocks seems to be waning as other shocks arising 
from preferences, government or even money have been shown to 
enhance the RBC framework. Time will only tell on how strong of 
an impact the RBC model will have on business cycle theory, but 
as a viable alternative to the demand-side approach, one cannot 
deny its influence in the area of business cycle studies.
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